=== pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-040.pdf === Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance. Among the extensive effects of hazards is the substantial financial loss incurred by the energy industry. Therefore, Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (DRFI) has emerged as one of the innovative approaches to minimize the financial impacts of different hazards, protecting our energy infrastructure and systems from potential disruptions, as well as cushioning the rate impact to consumers. Based on the World Bank Organization, DRFI aims to increase the resilience of vulnerable countries against the financial impact of disasters and to secure access to post-disaster financing before an event strikes, thus ensuring rapid, cost-effective resources to finance recovery and reconstruction efforts.18 The current situation of the DRFI in the energy sector is characterized by a growing recognition of its importance, but with room for further development. While some energy companies have started exploring and implementing the DRFI strategies, the overall adoption and integration of such in the sector remain relatively low. Limited awareness, inadequate understanding of the DRFI benefits, and challenges in accessing appropriate insurance products are some of the key factors hindering widespread implementation. To further advance the DRFI for the energy sector, the DOE plans to develop a strategic plan and comprehensive policies and programs. Its primary objective is to establish robust mechanisms and guidelines that effectively enhance the DRFI practices within the sector. Additionally, these policies and programs aim to ensure accessible funding sources necessary for promoting resilience, while incorporating measures to prevent any potential misuse or abuse of these financial sources. Development and implementing mechanisms, such as criteria or tools to properly assess energy resiliency can encourage investment and insurance of energy resiliency projects. The RCP and ERS may be able to provide an evidence-based guide to financing investments and securing the DRFI. Potential applications of ERS in innovative financing will continue to be explored in the next five (5) years.19 2. Disaster Preparedness * Outcome 10: Developed and improved preparedness measures, and operational and coordination mechanisms, as well as strengthened organizational capacities and practices to mitigate disaster effects and ensure expeditious restoration of energy supply during and in the aftermath of disruptive events. National Energy Contingency Plan (NECP) for "The Big One". One of the impending threats to our national security is the occurrence of a strong earthquake, particularly a Magnitude 7.2 Earthquake generated by the movement of the West Valley Fault (WVF) affecting the Greater Metro Manila Area (GMMA) to include parts of Region III (Central Luzon) and Region IV-A (CALABARZON). Based on the Metro Manila Earthquake Impact Reduction Study (MMEIRS) in 2004, the worst-case scenario would lead to substantial economic loss and severe damages to lives and properties due to the effects of the violent ground shaking such as fire/explosions, landslides, ground rupture, and liquefaction, among others. The energy sector facilities within GMMA would also suffer from severe damages and wide-service interruptions, such as the tripping and toppling of transmission and distribution infrastructures resulting in Total blackout of the Luzon Grid, as well as fire and explosion from LPG refilling plants and gasoline stations which may contribute to even massive casualties. 20 The DOE in partnership with the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation, Inc. (PDRF) and the Program Management Office for Earthquake Resiliency of the Greater Metro Manila Area (PMO-ERG), formally launched the National Energy Contingency Plan (NECP) for The Big One: A Magnitude 7.2 Earthquake Scenario in GMMA on 14 December 2022. The contingency plan contains a harmonized multi-sectoral contingency plan and coordinated disaster response and early recovery measures from various energy stakeholders, security agencies and other government agencies. 18 19 20 33 The World Bank, Disaster Risk Finance: A Primer – Core Principles and Operational Framework, 2018. Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation, APEC Energy Resiliency Guidelines, 2023, 14-15. Department of Energy, National Energy Contingency Plan for “The Big One”, 2023. Philippine Energy Plan Official Launching of the National Energy Contingency Plan for "The Big One" in GMMA === pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-041.pdf === Figure 23. NECP for “The Big One” Preparedness Measures and Pre-Arrangements The DC 2023-01-0002 or “Adoption of the National Energy Contingency Plan for ‘The Big One’” was also issued on 11 January 2023 to institutionalize the implementation of a harmonized contingency plan throughout the energy sector.21 It also establishes the Technical Working Group on Energy Sector Earthquake Resiliency (TWG-ESER) with an oversight function in the adoption and implementation of this plan. Among its functions is the supervision of the implementation of disaster response, pre-arrangements, and other coordination mechanisms by the energy sector (Figure 23). By virtue of this DC, the DOE, and its attached agencies shall develop contingency plans consistent with the NECP. Further, the energy stakeholders susceptible to the effects of “The Big One” from the WVF shall likewise integrate the response arrangements indicated in the NECP into their Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) or other contingency plans. National Oil and Gas Contingency Plan (NOGCP). Being a net importer of oil products, the country is vulnerable to oil supply volatility and demand dynamics in the international market leading to domestic pump price hikes and consequently affecting commodity prices. Moreover, extreme weather events also affect the local supply and pump prices. During the aftermath of Typhoon Odette, the TFER encountered fuel supply insufficiencies for Diesel Power Plants (DPPs) due to damaged seaports. There were also price spikes and temporary supply shortages in petroleum products in disaster-stricken areas due to hoarding and demand escalation. One of DOE’s key priorities for 2023 is to pursue contingency measures and activities to ensure energy supply during critical periods. In lieu of this, the development of a National Oil and Gas Contingency Plan (NOGCP) is underway to establish coordinated and harmonized response measures and prearrangements of the oil and gas industry together with the concerned government agencies in the event of external and internal supply disruptions based on the identified hazards and vulnerabilities in the sector. Workshop on the Formulation of the National Oil and Gas Contingency Plan (NOGCP) To kickstart the formulation of the NOGCP, the DOE, in partnership with the PDRF, conducted a threeday scoping workshop on 29-31 March 2023. From the outputs of the scoping workshop, the plan will be finalized after a series of writeshops, consultations, and focused group discussions (FGDs) with the industry stakeholders. The final output is targeted to be published and launched together with a DC for its adoption by the 3rd Quarter of 2024. National Power Contingency Plan (NPCP). In view of the power crisis in the late 80s and early 90s and the Luzonwide blackout in 2001, the DOE, together with the NPC, Transco and the private sector formulated the 2002 Power Contingency Plan (PCP), to ensure the reliable supply of electricity thereby sustaining economic activities in the country and minimizing any negative effects of system-wide outages or power deficiencies. With the advent of new and emerging threats, there is a need to update and develop a robust NPCP that will enhance power sector resilience, safeguard energy infrastructure, ensure a reliable supply of electricity, and promote sustainable development in the face of evolving challenges in the energy sector. The NPCP will likewise include a comprehensive framework that outlines strategies, procedures, and measures to mitigate potential power disruptions, enhance energy security, and build resilience in the power sector infrastructure and systems. The NPCP will highlight the importance of hazard and risk assessment, preparedness, coordinated response, strategic stockpiling, modernizing of electric facilities and system and capacity building. 21 Department Circular No. DC2023-01-0002 titled “Adoption of the National Energy Contingency Plan for ‘The Big One’”. Vo l u m e 3 34 === pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-042.pdf === * Outcome 11: Equipped and trained workforce to ensure continuous and quality public service and/or business continuity. Energy Sector Capacity Building. The DOE is steadfast in its commitment to enhancing the capabilities of individuals, organizations, and institutions within the sector. This is achieved through a comprehensive approach that focuses on developing and refining the necessary skills, knowledge, and expertise required to drive the sector forward. By investing in capacity-building programs and training initiatives, the energy sector aims to increase the pool of professionals on energy resiliency by equipping them the right and necessary tools and resources to tackle complex challenges, ready for uncertainties and stay abreast of technological advancements. In line with the resiliency initiatives of the energy sector, several capacity-building activities have been identified to support and promote its preparedness efforts. These activities are aimed to be included in the program of the DOETFER and member agencies for the next five years. The identified capacitybuilding activities encompass a range of focus areas and objectives, aiming to enhance the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of individuals and organizations within the energy sector. * Outcome 12: Established and strengthened partnerships with concerned international organizations, government agencies, energy industry participants, academe, NGOs including development partners, to adopt and implement the energy resiliency policies, plans, programs and protocols. DOE membership in the APEC Energy Resiliency Task Force (ERTF). Collaborative efforts among various stakeholders, including international organizations, government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector are essential to effectively address the multifaceted challenges caused by disasters. In line with this, the DOE serves as the co-chair (with the United States) of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – Energy Resiliency Task Force (APEC-ERTF) as a venue to facilitate discussions on energy resiliency. With the issued APEC Energy Resiliency Guidelines in February 2023, APEC member economies are guided to build energy systems resilient against both natural and human-induced disasters.22 The DOE regularly shares the resiliency innovations of the Philippine energy sector and likewise benefits from the initiatives of the member economies. NDRRMC Disaster Preparedness Pillar TWG on Energy Resilience Policy. In the performance of its mandate, the TFER, during the Typhoon Odette Disaster, has encountered several issues and concerns, particularly in Disaster Response and Early Recovery. Hence, DOE-TFER advocated for the creation of a TWG under the Disaster Preparedness Thematic Pillar (DPP) that will craft policy recommendations on the institutional arrangements of the energy sector for early preparedness and during disaster response/emergencies. As a recent development, the NDRRMC signed the NDRRMC DPP Resolution No. 5, Series of 2022 creating the TWG on Energy Resilience Policy headed by the DOE. Subsequently, the Terms of Reference (TOR) was approved by the DPP member agencies on 24 May 2023. Through this TWG, the energy sector shall have the avenue to coordinate with other concerned government agencies outside of the energy sector to suggest policy recommendations for a more coordinated and seamless disaster response to immediately restore power and ensure sufficient petroleum products in disaster-stricken areas. 3. Disaster Response and Early Recovery * Outcome 13: Implemented damage assessments and provided reliable and risk-based information for the expeditious restoration of energy supply after a disaster or disruptive event. Emergency Operation Center (EOC). The DOE aims to upgrade its disaster response operation and mechanism by establishing a physical Energy Sector Command Center/Emergency Operations Center (ESCoC/ESEOC) at the DOE Main Office and Field Offices for the enhancement of its decision-making, convergence, coordination, and monitoring of activities, as well as information sharing between and among agencies and other stakeholders.23 This project will be made possible through partnership with the PDRF with grant from the USAID-ESP. 22 23 35 Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation, APEC Energy Resiliency Guidelines, 2023, 5. Department Circular No. DC2022-06-0028, titled “Supplementing Department Circular No. DC2018-01-0001 on the Energy Resiliency Planning and Programming of the Energy Sector and on Task Force on Energy Resiliency (TFER) Functions and Structure to Mitigate Impacts of Disasters”, sec. 7 (7.10). Philippine Energy Plan === pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-043.pdf === This ESEOC will feature modern Information and Communications Technology (ICT) equipment for the real-time monitoring of the effects of disasters together with the updated hazard maps and dashboards of the energy facilities through the EDIMS platform. This will also serve as the hub for coordination and information sharing of TFER members during briefings and preparedness meetings, media briefings, among others. Capacity-building activities will also be regularly conducted to capacitate the workforce on how to operate the ESEOC. * Outcome 14: Developed and implemented a harmonized response plan, protocol, and manual of operations of the energy sector to immediately restore power supply and ensure sufficient supply of oil and gas in disaster-stricken areas. Deployment Plan of Task Force ‘Kapatid’ (TFK) for the Distribution Utilities. Following the adoption of the NECP for “The Big One,” one of the pre-arrangements is the development of a Deployment Plan for assisting the ECs through the TFK in response to the expected damages be incurred after a disaster. As a way forward, the TKP-Deployment Plan will target increasing membership from other private DUs, as well as the improvement of protocols and procedures, and strategic planning for the prepositioning of critical assets and equipment to ensure that continuous power restoration can be undertaken. The DOE, with the assistance of the NEA and other concerned DUs, shall study the establishment of regional asset hubs wherein different ECs and private DUs can store their emergency response and power restoration equipment. Creation of Task Force ‘Kadugo’ for the Oil and Gas Sector. The downstream oil and gas sector, in the spirit of “Kapatiran,” has been implementing the practice of mutual assistance to nearby companies that are in need, especially during disasters. As evidenced by the effectiveness and efficiency of the TFK by the DUs, this sector aims to create response protocols and arrangements for the deployment of a Task Force ‘Kadugo’ for the same purposes of expeditious emergency response and restoration of downstream oil and gas facilities/supply chain in the event of a disaster. This will further outline and coordinate the responses of the oil and gas industry stakeholders that will be involved in a more efficient emergency response. Fuel Allocation and Rationing Implementation Plan. Due to the dependency on oil supply importation, the country is also vulnerable to both external supply disruptions and instabilities caused by geopolitical issues, and supply and demand shifts, as well as internal supply disruptions caused by natural and human-induced hazards. Hence, one of the preparedness measures of the government through the DOE is to create a Fuel Allocation and Rationing Implementation Plan in preparation for a potential major oil supply disruption scenario. This will be extensively discussed in the NOGCP for internal and external disruptions that will be formulated by the DOE-TFER in partnership with concerned stakeholders. 4. Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery * Outcome 16: Developed and implemented rehabilitation and recovery plans and programs for damaged energy facilities aligned with the “Build Back Better” principle. Rehabilitation and Recovery Investment Plan (RRIP). Based on the World Bank Group, early adaptation and proactive resilience-building actions have been proven to be cost-effective, compared to waiting to address the severe impacts of natural and human-induced disasters, which can lead to higher costs and greater risks. One of the priorities of the NCCAP 2011-2028 is the climate-proofing and rehabilitation, and improvement of energy systems infrastructure.24 24 Climate Change Commission, National Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2028, 2011, 26. Vo l u m e 3 36 === pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-044.pdf === However, one of the primary obstacles in rehabilitation and recovery efforts is the high cost associated with infrastructure upgrades and improvements. Rehabilitating aging energy infrastructure, and implementing resilient technologies require substantial financial investments that may surpass the available resources of governments and industry players. Similarly, the limited availability of funding sources dedicated to energy rehabilitation and recovery poses a stumbling block. By investing in rehabilitation and recovery efforts with the "Build Back Better" principle in mind, we can enhance the resiliency of energy infrastructure and systems. This approach goes beyond addressing immediate needs in power restoration and focuses on creating a foundation for more resilient, sustainable, and disaster-proof energy infrastructures and systems. Thus, establishing the mechanisms for the RRIP will be explored in the next five years together with the relevant agencies. * Outcome 17: Improved regulatory support on cost recovery mechanisms and energy resiliency investments. Review of Regulatory Policies and Guidelines on Cost Recovery Mechanisms. The rehabilitation and recovery of damaged energy infrastructure in the country demands significant costs for repairs and restorations. The ERC shared the major challenges for Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) Figure 24. Summary of CAPEX Applications filed from 2008 to 2023 applications related to Force Majeure Events (FME). From 2008 to 2023, the ERC received a total of 103 FMErelated CAPEX applications, 73 of which are from the DUs, and the remaining 30 are from the NGCP, with proposed costs amounting to PhP10.14 billion. Notably, the DUs and NGCP facilities from the Visayas region have the largest share of CAPEX applications for FME due to the impact of Super Typhoon Yolanda and Odette25 (Figure 24). However, this does not reflect the whole picture of FME-related costs. Several DUs, especially ECs, encounter challenges in meeting the filing deadline of four months or 120 days from the occurrence of the FME to submit their CAPEX application due to difficulties in accurately accounting for the actual expenditures during the rehabilitation period. The DUs also face challenges in complying with the filing of approval for construction of facilities within 60 days from the implementation of the project as it reduces the filing period to 60 days for emergency or extraordinary cases pursuant to Section 20 (b) of R.A. 11659 or the Public Service Act.26 To assist the stakeholders, the ERC has provided templates and conducted regulatory education to guide the DUs in preparing their CAPEX applications. However, the concern regarding the inclusion of unrelated expenses in the application remains an issue. Out of the 121 ECs, only 13.2 percent, or 16 ECs were able to include their buffer stock requirements in the multi-year CAPEX filing as part of the resiliency programs. To address these challenges, the ERC is currently reviewing to amend its CAPEX rules to provide proper guidance to the DUs in preparing their multiyear CAPEX filings. The filing shall incorporate resiliency programs, including the provision of sufficient inventory of buffer material pursuant to the NEA Memorandum No. 2015-023. The ERC is also working with the NEA regarding the utilization of the Enhanced Integrated Computerized Planning Model (eICPM) to facilitate the filing and approval of the ECs' CAPEX application. In conjunction with these efforts, the ERC, in collaboration with the DOE and relevant stakeholders, shall thoroughly review the regulatory policies related to CAPEX application and develop an efficient cost recovery mechanism. B. Major Outputs for the Security of Energy Infrastructures and Systems Energy security lies at the heart of the country's socio-economic stability, progress, and sovereignty. It encompasses a broad spectrum of interrelated factors, such as energy supply diversity, infrastructure resilience, market efficiency, environmental sustainability, and the ability to respond to all energyrelated threats, both natural and human-induced. 25 26 37 Energy Regulatory Commission, Challenges and Best Practices on CAPEX Applications for Force Majeure, 2022. Republic Act No. 11659 titled “An Act Amending Commonwealth Act No. 146, Otherwise Known as the Public Service Act, as Amended”. Philippine Energy Plan === pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-045.pdf === The collaborative efforts of the DOE, policymakers, industry stakeholders, and civil society are crucial in shaping a coherent and forward-looking energy strategy that safeguards the nation's future. By focusing on fortifying the security parameters of critical energy infrastructures, adhering to high-quality security standards and protocols, creating mitigating efforts for present vulnerabilities and emerging threats, and collaborating in harmonized emergency responses to effectively react in case of emergencies and disasters. Embracing these focused actions, the country can forge a path toward a secure, resilient, and sustainable energy future. * Outcome 18: Increased coordination and cooperation of international, national, regional security agencies and other concerned entities to strengthen the security & protection of energy resources, infrastructures & systems. 1. Responding to Global and Regional Geopolitical Issues to Increase Energy Security The Philippines' energy security is intricately tied to a complex web of global and regional geopolitical issues, demanding a comprehensive approach to energy securitization. These issues have profound implications for the country's energy landscape, requiring continuous efforts and initiating developments on relevant approaches to energy security. Global Challenge: Intensifying conflict in Europe between Ukraine and Russia and other parts of the World At the global level, ongoing geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine continue to pose significant challenges to energy security. The conflict between the two nations has had repercussions on the stability of natural gas supplies to Europe. Recent developments, such as the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline connecting Russia directly to Germany, have sparked concerns about the potential for reduced gas transit through Ukraine. This situation highlights the vulnerability of energydependent nations, including the Philippines, to disruptions in global energy flows. As a result, the country must prioritize efforts to diversify energy sources, enhance energy efficiency, and develop resilient energy infrastructures to mitigate potential risks. • Support Diplomatic Efforts. The DOE can support diplomatic peace efforts by working closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in providing support to ensure that the energy sector is well-represented in international dialogues. By collaborating with the DFA, the DOE can contribute its technical expertise, data, and policy recommendations to inform and shape the country's energy interests and priorities during diplomatic discussions. This collaboration allows the DOE to provide valuable insights and information on energy-related matters, enabling the country to effectively advocate for its energy sector in the international arena. By aligning efforts and sharing knowledge, the DOE and the DFA can work together to ensure that the energy sector's perspectives and concerns are considered and integrated into diplomatic peace efforts, reducing the risk of energy disruptions caused by geopolitical conflicts. Regional Challenge: The West Philippine Sea Dispute The West Philippine Sea (WPS) dispute remains a critical geopolitical challenge directly threatening the country's energy security. Conflicting territorial claims in the region, particularly between China and multiple Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines, have raised concerns about access to the area's valuable oil and gas reserves. Recent developments in the WPS have seen increased militarization and assertive actions by certain countries, further exacerbating tensions. These actions have implications for the country’s exploration and development activities of these resources. The DOE together with the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS) are actively engaging in diplomatic efforts, upholding international law, and promoting multilateral cooperation to safeguard its energy interests in the region. There are several strategies that can be adopted that align with the ongoing efforts of the NTF-WPS and broader government initiatives. The DOE in collaboration with other government agencies shall support these strategies including the resumption of exploration activities to assert the country's rights within the framework of international law and engaging in regional energy cooperation. Vo l u m e 3 38 === pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-046.pdf === 2. Increasing Security of Energy Infrastructures and Systems against Internal Armed Conflicts, Sabotage and Terrorism To combat internal armed conflicts, sabotage, and terrorism in the country and ensure energy security, a comprehensive and coordinated approach is necessary. Here are relevant strategies and measures, including the efforts of specific national action plans, to address these challenges: • Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection. The bombing of transmission lines is a concerning issue that poses a significant threat to the country's power supply. These acts of violence also endanger lives and cause inconvenience to communities. One incident illustrating this issue is the bombing of the NGCP transmission lines in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On 25 October 2022, the NGCP tower No. 8 in Kauswagan was targeted, resulting in the toppling of the tower and the tripping of the Baloi-Aurora 138kV Transmission Line, which led to the power outages and manual load dropping in several areas in Mindanao. The National Action Plan on Critical Infrastructure Protection (NAP-CIP) is an initiative from the Anti-Terrorism Council-Program Management Center (ATC-PMC) that plays a vital role in enhancing the country’s preparedness against terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure and soft targets by instituting some measures by all stakeholders. The energy sector is one of the 14 critical infrastructures that needs to enhance security and build resilience by identifying the priority action activities in line with ATC-PMC’s framework, namely: 1) Prevent, 2) Protect, 3) Prepare and 4) Respond. Protecting these key energy assets from terrorist threats is crucial to build resilience, ensure uninterrupted energy supply, and maintain national security. The DOE targets the development of harmonized energy sector inputs to the NAP-CIP in the 4th Quarter of 2023. A multi-layered approach will be established within the energy sector and government stakeholders, which includes risk assessments, implementing security protocols and cybersecurity measures, intelligence sharing, incident response planning and sharing, and adopting of best practices from successful initiatives. • Development of Comprehensive Digital Mapping of Critical Energy Facilities. The DOE is actively acting in securing critical energy facilities by crafting a comprehensive policy, currently being drafted, that centers around mapping submarine, inter-island overhead and underground oil and gas pipelines, as well as power line facilities, to safeguard their safety and security. Through the consolidation of information and regular updates to digital maps, the DOE can effectively shield these crucial energy-related installations from potential disruptions. By ensuring compliance with industry standards and regulations, the policy enhances accountability, reduces economic losses, and facilitates efficient operations. Further, the creation of this confidential map and close coordination with relevant agencies bolster the DOE's overall efforts in mitigating threats that could potentially disrupt the supply of power and fuels, thus safeguarding the stability and reliability of the country's energy infrastructures. • Development of the Energy Sector Cybersecurity Program. As the energy sector, particularly the electric power industry, moves toward a more technological system or a “SMART Grid,” there will be an increased dependence on ICT. Section 2.27 of DC 2020-02-0003 or “Providing a National Smart Grid Policy Framework for the Philippine Electric Power Industry and Roadmap for Distribution Utilities” paves the way for the integration of these new technologies into their infostructures which increase vulnerability to cyberattacks. To address this gap, Section 5.7 of the same DC also mandates the electric power industry to develop a cybersecurity infrastructure that is compliant with global standards. Building the Energy Sector Cybersecurity Program To institutionalize and efficiently implement the cybersecurity resilience program of the energy sector, the DOE shall formulate an ‘Energy Sector Cybersecurity Policy’ and its roadmap to comply with the National Cybersecurity Plan (NCSP) 2023-2028. This policy will cover the organizational assessment and implementation of strategies to protect the ICT Pillars of identified critical infrastructures, such as the People, Process, and Technology (PPT). Some of the targeted deliverables are the creation of the Energy Sector Computer Emergency Response Team (ES-CERT) and its Security Operations Center (SOC), and the development of the following: 1) Cybersecurity Resilience Scorecard; 2) Customized Cybersecurity Standards; 3) Information and Operational 39 Philippine Energy Plan === pep-2023-2050-vol3-section-c2-page-047.pdf === Technologies Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Framework; 4) Cybersecurity Business Impact Analysis Framework; 5) Incident Response Plan; and, 6) Capacity Building Program. One major output underway is the finalization of the Philippine Electric Supply Chain (PESC) Cybersecurity Assessment Framework (CAF), which adopts the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity indicated in the NCSP 2017- 202227 and further reflected in the NCSP 2023-2028 (Figure 25). Figure 25. NIST Cybersecurity Framework Enhancing the DOE Cybersecurity Capability The DOE will devise and implement a comprehensive ‘DOE Cybersecurity Plan’ that shall cover the key areas for cybersecurity identified under the NCSP 2023-2028, namely: Information Security, Application Security, Network Security, Internet Security, and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.28 The DOE shall acquire cybersecurity-related certifications covering Corporate Governance of Information Technology, Information Security Management System, Risk Management, and Internet of Things. The DOE has established its network linkages with the DICT through the Cybersecurity Management Systems Project (CMSP), which is a platform consisting of security tools and technologies to assist the Philippine National Computer Emergency Response Team (PH-CERT) in responding to cyber incidents and attacks. The following deliverables were achieved as part of the collaborative work between the DOE and DICT under the CMSP: • • The DICT deployed the security tools and technologies (software and hardware) within the DOE, which monitors incoming and outgoing traffic; and, The DOE receives advisories from the PH-CERT on cybersecurity threats. The DOE personnel shall also undergo rigorous capacity-building activities to build its cybersecurity experience and expertise. * Outcome 19: Increased preparedness measures, organized monitoring, and coordinated response actions for the conduct of the elections. 3. Conduct of the National & Local Elections (NLE) and Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (BSKE) Electrical power disruptions during the national and local elections in the country critically threaten not only the integrity of the democratic process but also the country's energy security. These “unexpected outages,” which coincidentally occur during essential voting and vote tallying periods, could potentially serve as a medium for manipulating election outcomes. With this, a comprehensive approach that ensures robust energy security is essential in preserving the transparency and fairness of the electoral process while reinforcing the nation's resilience against power disruptions. The Energy Task Force Elections (ETFE), created through DC2018-05-0014, plays a crucial role in mitigating these disruptions. Since 2018, the ETFE has been boosting its preparations and implementing strategies and measures to combat power disruption during elections through: 1) Harmonizing Communication and Coordination; 2) Conducting Power Infrastructure Inspections; 3) Implementing Back-up Power Solutions; 3) Strengthening Monitoring and Rapid Response Systems; and, 5) Consolidating the Security Plans of agencies. The ETFE shall continue to enhance its protocols in support of reliable and peaceful conduct of elections. 27 28 Department of Information and Communications Technology, The National Cybersecurity Plan (NCSP) 2023-2028, 2023, 20. Department of Information and Communications Technology, The National Cybersecurity Plan (NCSP) 2023-2028, 2023, 25-28. Vo l u m e 3 40